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LOVING’S LEGACY:  DECRIMINALIZATION AND 
THE REGULATION OF SEX AND SEXUALITY 
Melissa Murray* 
 
2017 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia, the landmark 
Supreme Court decision that invalidated bans on miscegenation and 
interracial marriages.  In the years since Loving was decided, it remains a 
subject of intense scholarly debate and attention.  The conventional wisdom 
suggests that the Court’s decision in Loving was hugely transformative—
decriminalizing interracial marriages and relationships and removing the 
most pernicious legal barriers to such couplings.  But other developments 
suggest otherwise. 
If we shift our lens from marriages to other areas of the law—child custody 
cases, for example—Loving’s legacy seems less rosy.  In the years preceding 
and following Loving, white women routinely lost custody of their white 
children when they remarried or began dating black men.  That this should 
happen in the years before Loving is perhaps unsurprising.  But one might 
expect a shift after Loving, when interracial marriages and dating were 
decriminalized and made lawful.  This was not the case.  Even after Loving, 
white women routinely lost custody when they remarried or dated black men. 
These underexplored child-custody cases illuminate an important aspect 
of Loving—and indeed, any civil rights effort that is predicated on 
decriminalization.  Despite the turn toward decriminalization and 
subsequent legalization, the impulse to punish and stigmatize certain conduct 
does not dissipate entirely.  Instead, it may simply be rerouted into other legal 
avenues where disapprobation of the challenged conduct may continue to be 
expressed and felt.  Recognizing and understanding this “regulatory 
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displacement” phenomenon is critical as we assess the progress of other 
decriminalization efforts, including the recent struggle to legalize same-sex 
marriages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
2017 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia,1 the landmark 
U.S. Supreme Court decision that invalidated bans on miscegenation and 
interracial marriages.  In the fifty years since Loving was decided, it remains 
a subject of intense scholarly debate and attention.2  Some have argued that 
Loving was a transformative decision, delivering a death blow to the most 
durable aspect of Jim Crow segregation—its antipathy for race mixing—and 
marking a path toward dismantling the residue of racism in the United 
States.3  Others have focused on the decision’s lasting implications for other 
civil rights projects, notably the struggle for marriage equality.4  Others have 
been less sanguine about Loving.  Although the decision formally eradicated 
bans on interracial marriages, critics have noted that social taboos around 
interracial sex and marriage persist, especially between particular groups.5  
On this account, although Loving largely dismantled the legal impediments 
to interracial marriage and relationships, it did little to undermine the social 
impediments between those who dare to love across the color line. 
I do not dispute the latter point.  Although much has changed in our society, 
the norm of racial homogamy remains remarkably durable, particularly 
 
 1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 2. See, e.g., Paula Joy Strand, Loving and Loving:  Eroding the Stance of Other, 50 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 621, 626–27 (2017) (discussing how Loving disrupted the social 
constructions of race in America). 
 3. See, e.g., Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency:  Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, 
and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (1998) (examining the Court’s history 
leading up to Loving and arguing that the case ultimately “remov[ed] the last legally-enforced 
barrier facing Americans of color”). 
 4. See generally Mark Strasser, Let Me Count the Ways:  The Unconstitutionality of 
Same-Sex-Marriage Bans, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 301 (2013) (arguing that Loving’s impact on 
equal protection and due process jurisprudence would render same-sex marriage bans 
vulnerable even under rational basis review). 
 5. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy of Jim Crow:  The Enduring Taboo of Black-
White Romance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 739, 755–61 (2006) (book review) (discussing post-Loving 
taboos around interracial relationships). 
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among certain groups.6  Indeed, as some scholars have noted, the preference 
for in-group marriage is so strong that individuals may choose to forgo 
marriage entirely, or settle for less desirable marriage partners, rather than 
marry outside of the race.7 
Instead, my focus is on the first point.  If Loving accomplished anything, 
its legacy is in formally dismantling the legal impediments that banned 
interracial marriage and relationships.  Today, this aspect of Loving—the 
notion that law no longer bars interracial love—is taken as an article of faith.  
On this account, the real issue is whether, and how, to disrupt the social norms 
that remain the primary deterrent to racial heterogamy.  But is this account 
correct?  Is it the case that, post-Loving, law is neutral to the question of 
interracial relationships? 
This Article argues that if we shift our lens from marriage to other areas of 
the law—child-custody cases, for example—Loving’s legal legacy is 
decidedly more complicated.  Although Loving decriminalized interracial 
marriages, post-Loving, law continued to actively discourage interracial love 
and romance, albeit through different means.  As this Article documents, in 
the years preceding and following Loving, white women routinely lost 
custody of their white children when they remarried or dated black men.  That 
this should happen in the years before Loving is perhaps unsurprising.  After 
all, interracial marriages were prohibited in a number of jurisdictions and 
considered taboo, even in those jurisdictions where they were permitted.  But 
one might have expected a shift after Loving, when interracial marriages and 
dating were decriminalized and legalized throughout the country.  This, 
however, was not the case.  Even after Loving, white women frequently lost 
custody when they remarried or dated black men. 
This aspect of Loving’s afterlife tells us much about the law’s enduring 
skepticism of interracial relationships, but it also offers important lessons 
about law reform that go beyond the issue of interracial love.  On this point, 
it is worth remembering that Loving was not simply a case about interracial 
marriage, it was a case about crime and, specifically, the use of the criminal 
law to signal public disapprobation of interracial marriages and relationships.  
In striking down miscegenation bans, the Loving Court decriminalized 
interracial marriages, thereby making them legal throughout the country.  
Critically, however, Loving did not eradicate the legal impulse to deter and 
punish interracial marriage and romance.  Instead, the interest in deterring 
and punishing interracial relationships shifted to other venues—including the 
civil context of child custody. 
On this account, these underexplored child-custody cases illuminate an 
important aspect of Loving—and indeed, any effort to use decriminalization 
as a vehicle of law reform.  Despite the strong impulse toward 
decriminalization, the impulse to punish and stigmatize certain conduct does 
not dissipate entirely.  Instead, it may simply be rerouted into other legal 
 
 6. See GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & ANNA BROWN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., INTERMARRIAGE 
IN THE U.S. 50 YEARS AFTER LOVING V. VIRGINIA 5–8 (2017). 
 7. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?:  HOW THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 115–28 (2012). 
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avenues where disapprobation of the challenged conduct may continue to be 
expressed and felt.  As this Article argues, recognizing and understanding 
this phenomenon, which I have termed “regulatory displacement,” is critical 
not only for understanding Loving’s legacy but for assessing the progress of 
other decriminalization efforts, including the recent struggle to legalize same-
sex marriages.8 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the Loving decision 
and the conventional wisdom that posits Loving as eradicating most legal 
barriers to interracial marriage and relationships.  Part II shifts to the 
consideration of race in child-custody cases.  As this Part explains, following 
Loving, courts stripped white mothers of custody of their children when they 
remarried or dated interracially.  Critically, Loving altered the landscape in 
which such decisions could be made.  Recognizing that the fact of an 
interracial relationship, without more, was likely to prompt close scrutiny 
upon appellate review, courts went to great lengths to couch their decisions 
in more neutral terms.  But while the rationales were nominally race neutral, 
the outcomes were the same.  White women often lost custody of their 
children as a penalty for dating and marrying across racial lines. 
Part III reflects on the implications of this history.  As this Part explains, 
these custody cases complicate the conventional wisdom that surrounds 
Loving.  Although Loving removed most formal legal barriers to interracial 
relationships, it did not eliminate all legal deterrents to such relationships.  
As importantly, though Loving eliminated the use of the criminal law as a 
vehicle for stigmatizing and punishing interracial relationships, other legal 
vehicles emerged to continue communicating law’s disapprobation of 
racially transgressive relationships.  This aspect of Loving warrants further 
consideration.  Historically, the effort to liberalize laws that regulate sex and 
sexuality has relied primarily on decriminalization as a tool of legal reform.  
However, as this history makes clear, decriminalization as a method of law 
reform has important limitations that must be recognized and understood. 
I.  LOVING V. VIRGINIA:  THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The facts of Loving are well known.  In June 1958, Richard Loving, a white 
man, and Mildred Jeter, a black woman, left their home in Virginia and 
traveled to the District of Columbia in order to marry.9  Upon returning to 
Virginia, where they began cohabiting as man and wife, the Lovings were 
charged and convicted of violating Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924, 
which prohibited interracial unions.10  The Lovings challenged their 
convictions through the Virginia state court system all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
The Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the convictions and, in so 
doing, invalidated Virginia’s miscegenation laws.11  Because the statutes 
 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
 10. Id. at 2–3. 
 11. Id. at 11–12. 
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rested “solely on distinctions drawn according to race” and were “designed 
to maintain White Supremacy,”12 the Court concluded that they were 
unconstitutional, having “patently no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination.”13  The Court went further to 
note that the statutes “also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process 
of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”14  “Under our Constitution,” the Court reasoned, “the freedom 
to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual 
and cannot be infringed by the State.”15 
In the fifty years since it was decided, Loving v. Virginia has come to stand 
for various constitutional principles.  It confirmed the fundamental right to 
marry16 and, in doing so, undergirded the logic of Obergefell v. Hodges,17 
the 2015 Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage.18  It has also 
been understood as a critical civil rights intervention, “invalidat[ing] racial 
classifications and other practices that perpetuate racial subordination.”19  
But, perhaps most importantly, Loving has come to represent the 
“unequivocal condemnation of legal barriers to interracial marriage.”20  
Indeed, for many, this canonical decision is an “unambiguous triumph” that 
“racially deregulat[ed] the marriage market” by eliminating the most 
pernicious legal impediments to interracial coupling.21 
The emphasis on Loving’s removal of legal barriers to interracial coupling 
is meaningful.  As studies show, although there has been a steady increase in 
interracial marriages since the Loving decision,22 rates of interracial marriage 
and relationships remain low in the United States.23  In 2015, just over 16 
percent of all married couples included spouses of different races.24  While 
this represents an increase since 1970, when less than 1 percent of married 
couples were interracial,25 it is below what might result under random 
matching.  Indeed, one study reports that 44 percent of all U.S. marriages 
 
 12. Id. at 11. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 12. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (citing Loving for the proposition 
that “the right to marry is of fundamental importance”). 
 17. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 18. Id. at 2599. 
 19. John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, in LOVING V. 
VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD:  RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 13, 13 (Kevin 
Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012). 
 20. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1855 (1996). 
 21. Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing with Loving?:  Race, Law, and Intermarriage, 
77 B.U. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997). 
 22. LIVINGSTON & BROWN, supra note 6, at 5. 
 23. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:  SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND 
ADOPTION 127 (2003) (“It should therefore be stressed that mixed marriages remain 
remarkably rare.”). 
 24. LIVINGSTON & BROWN, supra note 6, at 5. 
 25. Sharon M. Lee & Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families:  U.S. Racial and 
Hispanic Intermarriages, POPULATION BULL., June 2005, at 11. 
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would be interracial under random matching weighted by the size of the 
relevant groups.26 
On this telling, law no longer plays a direct role in prohibiting interracial 
couplings, as it did in the period when miscegenation bans, like the one 
invalidated in Loving, were common.  Instead, the relative dearth of 
interracial marriages is attributable to informal cultural and social norms that 
continue to stigmatize and discredit interracial unions.27  For example, 
Professor Erica Chito Childs notes that views on interracial marriage differ 
by racial group, with whites claiming that they “[did not] have a problem 
with interracial relationships” but nevertheless “actively express[ing] reasons 
why they (and those close to them) would not, could not, and should not be 
involved interracially.”28  While African Americans signaled tentative 
acceptance of those in interracial unions, they nonetheless expressed serious 
concerns, including the view that the African American member of a black-
white couple was “selling out.”29  These kinds of informal social and cultural 
norms, Childs suggests, continue to discourage interracial pairings, 
especially among African Americans and whites.30 
Some scholars, however, have made clear that cultural norms alone do not 
explain the durability of racial homogamy.  As they explain, law, in tandem 
with social and cultural norms, has played a role in facilitating racial 
homogamy, although not in the form of direct legal prohibitions, as was the 
case with antimiscegenation bans.31  Instead, law, by structuring default 
norms around coupling and failing to regulate certain contexts, cultivates, 
 
 26. Raymond Fisman et al., Racial Preferences in Dating, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 117, 117 
(2008).  The study calculated this figure based on the U.S. population regardless of age but 
asserted that “[a]lternative measures that restrict the calculation to ‘marriageable’ populations 
yield a similar figure.” Id. at 117 n.1. 
 27. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 127 (“At the dawn of the twenty-first century, a 
wide array of social pressures continue to make white-black marital crossings more difficult, 
more costly, and thus less frequent than other types of interethnic or interracial crossings.”); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Taking the “Garbage” Out in Tulia, Texas:  The Taboo on Black-White 
Romance and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs,” 2007 WIS. L. REV. 283, 297 (“Racial 
separation in U.S. society does much to explain the low rates of intermarriage between blacks 
and whites. De facto residential and school segregation remains a pressing reality in the 
modern United States.”); Johnson, supra note 5, at 757–59 (identifying structural and social 
impediments to interracial romance). 
 28. Erica Chito Childs, Listening to the Interracial Canary:  Contemporary Views on 
Interracial Relationships Among Blacks and Whites, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2771, 2774, 2778 
(2008). 
 29. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 890, 904 (2006) 
(“[O]ne risks destabilizing his or her racial identity as a black person by marrying a non-Black, 
especially a White.” (citing LAWRENCE OTIS GRAHAM, MEMBER OF THE CLUB:  REFLECTIONS 
ON LIFE IN A RACIALLY POLARIZED WORLD 41 (1995) (describing how the race of one’s spouse 
may label a black individual as a sellout))); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 760 (“Marrying 
outside of one’s own race can be viewed as racial betrayal and can signify the internalization 
of the belief in black inferiority.”). 
 30. See Childs, supra note 28, at 2780. 
 31. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination:  The State’s Role in the Accidents 
of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308–09 (2009) (noting that the state plays 
“important roles” in reinforcing the “norm” of racial homogamy “by shaping social capital 
and relative advantages” and facilitating “the accidents of who meets whom and how”). 
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albeit indirectly, conditions that favor in-group dating and marriage.32  For 
example, a number of scholars have noted the role that de facto residential 
segregation plays in facilitating racial homogamy.33  As they explain, a 
combination of land use and economic policies have contributed to racial 
segregation in many American cities and towns.34  Because individuals are 
likely to seek romantic partners in the areas in which they live, these 
residential housing patterns perpetuate in-group coupling.35  Professor 
Dorothy Roberts makes the point more concretely:  despite the legality of 
interracial marriage in cities like Chicago, residential segregation operated 
“as a deterrent to interracial intimacy and penalized those who breached the 
taboo against interracial marriage.”36 
And it is not simply law’s cultivation of homogenous spaces that deters 
interracial coupling.  As Professor Russell Robinson suggests, law’s failure 
to regulate virtual spaces, like internet dating sites, may also contribute to the 
durability of intraracial dating and racial homogamy.37  As he explains, 
“[l]aw and social norms create structures that channel and limit our 
interactions with people of various identities,”38 facilitating, albeit indirectly, 
intraracial coupling. 
On this account, although law no longer affirmatively prohibits interracial 
coupling, it nonetheless structures, indirectly and perhaps unwittingly, the 
background norms against which intimate choices are made.  But is this 
account correct?  Is it the case that law no longer plays a direct role in 
fostering the norm of racial homogamy and instead plays only an indirect role 
in shaping romantic choices?  In Part II, I take up these questions.  In doing 
 
 32. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins:  Non-Traditional Kinship and 
the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 48–49 (2012) (arguing 
that the law uses the “back door” method of regulating on the margins “to articulate a 
normative vision of intimate and family life” that is focused on heterosexual married couples); 
see also Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2787, 2788 (2008) (discussing how the structure created by the interaction of law and 
norms “determines, in part, the romantic possibilities and inclinations we imagine, express, 
and pursue”). 
 33. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:  COLOR-BLIND RACISM 
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (2006) (discussing the 
role of residential segregation in impeding interracial interactions); Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Crossing Two Color Lines:  Interracial Marriage and Residential Segregation in Chicago, 45 
CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (discussing how residential segregation complemented racial 
homogamy in Chicago); Robinson, supra note 32, at 2788 (“Residential segregation is a 
primary influence on romantic preferences.”). 
 34. See Roberts, supra note 33, at 13 (noting that, in Chicago, “[f]orced segregation 
required a colossal systemic effort carried out by realtors, banks, neighborhood associations, 
national organizations, and government officials . . . all sanctioned by legal authority”); see 
also Solangel Maldonado, Romantic Discrimination and Children, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105, 
132 (2017) (“Racially restrictive covenants, redlining, and racial steering created the racially 
segregated neighborhoods and schools that anti-discrimination laws have failed to integrate.”). 
 35. See Robinson, supra note 32, at 2788–89 (discussing how the racial makeup of a 
neighborhood can dramatically impact an individual’s romantic preferences). 
 36. Roberts, supra note 33, at 27. 
 37. Robinson, supra note 32, at 2794 (“Whether compelled or encouraged by law or 
adopted voluntarily, the designers of a web site might reduce users’ consideration of race in 
assembling a pool of potential dates.”). 
 38. Id. at 2788. 
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so, I demonstrate that while Loving eliminated the most egregious formal 
legal barriers—antimiscegenation laws—law continued to play a role in 
impeding interracial unions.  Critically, this role was not merely indirect.  As 
the following Part demonstrates, through the vehicle of child-custody 
decisions, law played a direct role in discrediting and penalizing interracial 
unions. 
II.  RACE AND CHILD CUSTODY BEFORE AND AFTER LOVING 
The conventional wisdom surrounding Loving v. Virginia holds that this 
landmark case eradicated formal legal barriers to interracial marriages.  This 
Part complicates this rosy narrative of legal reform and progress.  As this Part 
explains, although Loving invalidated miscegenation laws that prohibited 
interracial unions, it left open other legal avenues for stigmatizing, punishing, 
and discouraging interracial unions.  Specifically, the arena of child custody 
often proved to be an especially potent vehicle for communicating 
disapprobation of interracial unions, even after Loving.39  The Parts that 
follow detail custodial challenges in the wake of interracial marriages before 
and after Loving.40 
A.  Custodial Challenges Before Loving 
It is perhaps unsurprising that, in the years before Loving was decided, 
custodial disputes involving mixed race couples were relatively rare in the 
South.  As Professor Renee Romano has documented, in 1945, just two 
decades before Loving was decided, thirty states had laws that criminalized 
interracial unions.41  The fact of criminalization was often enough to deter 
such unions.  Accordingly, during this pre-Loving period, custodial disputes 
involving mixed-race unions typically arose in the handful of ostensibly 
 
 39. In reviewing child-custody decisions, I do not mean to suggest that child custody is 
the only area in which the law continues to express skepticism of interracial relationships.  As 
Professor Kevin Johnson has documented, antipathy for interracial relationships, in tandem 
with a concern for drug trafficking, fueled prosecutorial decisions in Tulia, Texas. See 
generally Johnson, supra note 27.  Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig has demonstrated the 
manner in which workplace discrimination laws work to discourage interracial relationships. 
See ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS:  RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER 
AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY 199–232 (2013).  Likewise, skepticism about the 
propriety of interracial relationships may lead law enforcement to mistake interracial couples 
for those engaged in illicit sexual pursuits. See Elizabeth M. Toledo, Note, When Loving Is 
Not Enough, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2016). 
 40. A note about methodology.  To compile the cases for this case study, I searched 
LexisNexis and Westlaw state and federal cases databases using the following search terms:  
“‘interracial marriage’ /s custody,” “interracial /p custody,” “interracial /s custody /s modif!.”  
This resulted in a set of just over thirty reported appellate decisions, most of which explicitly 
referenced lower court decisions below.  To be clear, this set does not encompass the entire 
universe of custodial cases, many of which are not appealed and, as such, are unlikely to be 
reported and available on traditional legal databases.  Nevertheless, the fact that roughly thirty 
cases resulted from this search may suggest that similar cases likely arose but were never 
appealed or reported.  
 41. Renee C. Romano, “Immoral Conduct”:  White Women, Racial Transgressions, and 
Custody Disputes, in “BAD” MOTHERS:  THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 230, 231 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umansky eds., 2003). 
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“progressive” midwestern and northern states where interracial unions were 
permitted.42 
But, even in “progressive” states where interracial marriages were lawful, 
courts often took a dim view of white mothers who divorced their white 
husbands and subsequently partnered with someone of a different race.  
Critically, these cases reveal the force of social disapprobation of interracial 
unions—even in states that nominally permitted such marriages.  In these 
cases, the courts did not rely exclusively on the fact of an interracial marriage 
in transferring custody.  Instead, in their efforts to consider the child’s best 
interests, the courts often took into account the interracial marriage alongside 
a range of other facially race-neutral factors.  In so doing, they frequently 
overrode the (gendered) presumption that favored vesting custody of young 
children with the mother.43 
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser44 is instructive on these points.  There, 
Ann Portnoy Strasser, who had divorced her white husband, found herself 
battling her own mother for custody of her daughter, Robin.45  Molly Portnoy 
sought custody of Robin on the grounds that Strasser was “unable properly 
to maintain and rear the child,” was a communist, lacked “any regard for [the 
child’s] religious upbringing,” and, perhaps most damning, was “married to 
a second husband who is of a race and religion different from that of the 
child.”46 
The trial court concluded that Strasser “had neglected the child’s care and 
training because of other activities in which [she] participated” and granted 
Portnoy’s petition.47  The intermediate appellate court agreed with the trial 
court that Strasser was “not a fit or proper person to have custody” and 
affirmed.48  On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Strasser’s lawyers, 
as well as several amici, sought to prove that Portnoy’s claims that Strasser 
was a neglectful and disinterested mother were merely pretextual.  In fact, 
what had animated Portnoy’s decision to seek custody was Strasser’s 
interracial relationship.49  As they noted, Portnoy had not initiated custody 
proceedings until well after her efforts to break up Strasser’s interracial 
marriage proved fruitless.50  Equally troubling was the trial court’s “subtle 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. This presumption, known as the “tender years” doctrine, maintained that maternal 
custody of young children was in the child’s best interests.  The origin of the doctrine is 
attributed to the case Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544 (Md. Ch. 1830), where the court noted 
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place it in the coarse hands of the father,” id. at 562–63. 
 44. 104 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1952). 
 45. Id. at 896. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  Evidence of this neglect included enrolling the child in nursery school from nine 
a.m. to five p.m. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 27–31, Strasser, 104 N.E.2d 895 ; Brief for the 
New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers’ Guild as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Defendant-Appellant at 17, Strasser, 104 N.E.2d 895. 
 50. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 49, at 25 (quoting Portnoy as saying, “I 
want you to leave him . . . or I shall take your child away from you”). 
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and serious social prejudice” in crediting Portnoy’s racially inflected 
concerns.51  The custody petition was nothing more than Portnoy’s effort to 
punish Strasser for her marital transgression and “to compel her . . . to leave 
the husband she love[d].”52  In the end, the New York Court of Appeals 
agreed, concluding that the trial court lacked meaningful evidence that would 
override a fit parent’s right to custody of her children.  Reiterating that only 
“the gravest reasons” could justify transferring custody from a fit parent to 
another person, the court ordered Robin returned to Strasser’s care.53 
Portnoy v. Strasser was not anomalous.  In making custodial decisions, 
courts in ostensibly progressive jurisdictions were loath to rely exclusively 
on the fact of an interracial marriage.  Instead, they relied on a constellation 
of other factors—a mother’s “serious rebellion,”54 the “social and 
economic”55 conditions that attended the mother’s new living situation, the 
fact that the mother’s interracial marriage had alienated her parents, thereby 
depriving the child of contact with his maternal grandparents—to support 
their decisions to divest mothers of their custodial rights.56 
For example, in Stingley v. Wesch,57 a 1966 Illinois case, Marta Wesch 
Stingley lost custody of her son, Alan, upon her remarriage to Wayne 
Stingley, whom the court noted was “of the Negro race.”58  As in Strasser, 
Stingley’s own parents were staunchly opposed to her remarriage, and 
sought, along with her ex-husband, custody of Alan.59  The trial court agreed 
and modified the original custodial degree to award custody of Alan to his 
maternal grandparents over the claims of both parents.60  In doing so, the trial 
court specifically found “that neither the mother nor the father are unfit 
persons and that both desire the custody of the child” but nonetheless 
determined that the custodial change was “for [Alan’s] personal benefit and 
for social and economic reasons.”61  In this regard, the trial court’s decision 
likely evinced prevailing racial and gender norms associated with the family.  
Not only did the trial court’s decision to award custody to the maternal 
grandparents suggest discomfort with the prospect of a child being raised in 
an interracial household, it also suggested a desire to ensure that the child 
would be reared by a female caregiver. 
But if the trial court was focused on social norms regarding race and gender 
in rendering a decision, the reviewing court considered other values.  On 
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court made clear that to warrant a modification 
of child custody, “the change in circumstance must be substantial” and “must 
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 53. Strasser, 104 N.E.2d at 896. 
 54. Potter v. Potter, 127 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Mich. 1964). 
 55. Stingley v. Wesch, 222 N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ill. 1966). 
 56. See Murphy v. Murphy, 124 A.2d 891, 893 (Conn. 1956). 
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 58. Id. at 506. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 506, 507. 
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relate to the welfare of the child.”62  On this view, “nothing short of a hearing 
relating to unfitness and the interests of the child and a finding thereon is 
adequate support for an order changing custody.”63  Critically, the court 
underscored that Stingley’s remarriage to a black man was “not of itself a 
sufficient reason for changing an order of custody.”64  Recognizing that the 
“rights of the parent are superior to those of any other person,” as well as the 
unorthodox nature of a court issuing a decision awarding custody to a child’s 
maternal grandparents while concurrently acknowledging the fitness of both 
parents, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court 
“for further proceedings to determine custody as between the parents 
consistent with the views” expressed in its opinion.65 
Both Strasser and Stingley underscore the importance of appellate review 
in these circumstances.  In both cases, appellate courts—despite the 
discretion typically afforded trial courts in custodial decisions—probed 
beneath the surface to explicitly and implicitly question whether the mother’s 
interracial remarriage had colored the trial court’s analysis.  In other cases, 
however, appellate tribunals seemed all too willing to credit the trial court’s 
reasoning, however spurious. 
In Murphy v. Murphy,66 a Connecticut trial court transferred custody from 
a white mother to her ex-husband following her remarriage to an African 
American man.67  The court did not root its decision in the interracial 
remarriage explicitly but focused instead on the mother’s excommunication 
from the Catholic Church following her remarriage, her failure to make 
provisions for her son’s religious education, and her alienation from her 
parents following the remarriage, which had deprived her son of his 
grandparents’ “care and good influence.”68  Transferring custody to the ex-
husband, by contrast, offered the prospect of “being brought up in a clean, 
modern, comfortable home [with the child’s sister, who remained in the 
custody of the ex-husband], under the supervision of the defendant, and their 
paternal grandmother, with an opportunity to visit their maternal 
grandparents . . . and with the opportunity to continue their religious 
education in a Catholic home.”69 
On appeal, the Connecticut high court affirmed the decision.  It concluded 
that, despite the mother’s claims that her remarriage had shaped the trial 
court’s reasoning, the lower court’s decision, in fact, had been “guided and 
controlled by” the best interests of the child.70  Further, the appellate court 
determined that “the subordinate facts,” which were race neutral and did not 
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refer to the mother’s interracial marriage, “amply justif[ied] the conclusion 
that the change of custody” was in the child’s best interest.71 
These pre-Loving cases are noteworthy.  In these seemingly progressive 
jurisdictions where interracial unions were lawful, white mothers paid a high 
price for marrying interracially.  And, meaningfully, many of them were 
confident that the decision to vest them of custody hinged on the fact of their 
interracial marriage, even when the courts professed race-neutral 
justifications.  In this regard, the “best interests of the child” analysis, which 
is both capacious and prone to subjective judgments, allowed courts to mask 
any antipathy for interracial unions by considering a range of other factors in 
the custodial decision.  And indeed, insulated by the cover of the “best 
interests” standard, courts were free to consider race in ways that were both 
implicit and explicit. 
For example, in vindicating the child’s best interests, courts often 
explicitly considered the consequences of interracial marriages on children—
and found interracial families to be deeply problematic and troubling.  In 
Ward v. Ward,72 decided in 1950, a Washington trial court explicitly focused 
on the effects of an interracial marriage on the children born of the union.73  
The court’s decision arose in the context of a custody dispute between a white 
woman and her ex-husband, a black man.  The father sought custody of the 
couple’s two daughters who, according to the court, presented as “colored.”74  
In arguing for custody, the father pointed to the mother’s “associat[ions] with 
other men, and . . . excessive use of intoxicating liquor.”75  The trial court 
agreed with the father and granted him custody alongside an order “that he 
turn [his daughters] over for care and attention to Goldie Green, his mother, 
to whom he shall pay the necessary money for their care and support.”76 
The court’s decision was unusual in numerous respects.  As an initial 
matter, although the court did not vest custody in the mother, it nonetheless 
evinced a clear preference for maternal custody by insisting that the father 
enlist his mother’s assistance in caring for his two daughters.  As importantly, 
the court evinced a preference for the monoracial family.  According to the 
court, the two daughters were phenotypically “colored”—that is, they had 
African American coloring and features that distinguished them from their 
white mother.77  Granting custody to the father and paternal grandmother 
would provide the two daughters with a monoracial family unit and strong 
ties to the African American community—important considerations for two 
girls who, in the court’s view, appeared to be “colored” rather than white.  
Moreover, vesting custody in the white mother would require the girls to be 
raised in an interracial household without strong ties to the African American 
community and, perhaps more troublingly, would prevent the mother from 
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successfully reintegrating into white society upon the dissolution of her 
interracial marriage. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington acknowledged the 
unorthodox nature of the trial court’s decision to vest custody in a nonparent, 
but it nonetheless expressed satisfaction with the lower court’s decision.78  
Indeed, the high court offered additional reasons “why [it thought] the trial 
court was correct in its ruling.”79  While the Supreme Court of Washington 
did not question the mother’s “love for her children,” its 
primary concern [wa]s the welfare of the children. . . .  These unfortunate 
girls, through no fault of their own, are the victims of a mixed marriage and 
a broken home.  They will have a much better opportunity to take their 
rightful place in society if they are brought up among their own people.80 
In this vein, the high court made explicit what the trial court had only 
intimated.  Interracial marriages, by themselves, posed grave harms to 
children.  Those born into interracial marriages were doomed to be unwitting 
victims of their parents’ selfish desires—confused in their racial identity and 
betwixt and between two racial worlds.  For white children brought into 
interracial households through a parent’s subsequent remarriage, the 
concerns were perhaps even more profound.  Because many interracial 
couples typically lived apart from white society, white children raised in an 
interracial household with a stepparent of another race risked losing their ties 
to the white world—and the many privileges associated with whiteness. 
Another case from this era illustrates these concerns about the loss of 
whiteness, albeit in a slightly different context.  In In re Adoption of a 
Minor,81 an African American stepfather sought to adopt his white wife’s 
white son from a previous relationship.82  Importantly, the child had been 
born outside of marriage and had no relationship with his biological father, 
whose whereabouts were unknown.83  Although the child had lived with his 
mother and her husband since their marriage, and they had “supported and 
carefully reared the child as their own,”84 the trial court refused the adoption 
petition.85  In so doing, the trial court conceded the unorthodox nature of its 
decision, which would deny an illegitimate child the opportunity to be 
adopted and raised as legitimate.86  Typically, adoptions under such 
circumstances “should be not only approved but encouraged.”87  But the 
stepfather’s race proved a “problem” for the court.88  Fearing that the child 
“might lose the social status of a white man by reason of the fact that by 
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record his father will be a negro,” the trial court denied the petition, citing 
concern for the child’s best interests.89 
In both Ward v. Ward and In re Adoption of a Minor, the courts’ 
considerations are illuminating.  Even in jurisdictions where interracial 
marriages were lawful, other concerns—including broad concerns about 
children’s welfare, the “society” in which they would be raised, and the loss 
of whiteness and its privileges—furnished ample grounds for custodial 
decisions.  In so doing, these considerations underwrote the continued 
disapprobation of mixed-race marriages. 
B.  Child Custody Decisions After Loving v. Virginia 
As Part II.A notes, prior to Loving, in jurisdictions where interracial 
marriages were permitted, courts nonetheless took a dim view of such unions 
when making custodial decisions.  The question is whether Loving v. Virginia 
had an impact on courts’ consideration of custodial decisions.  On this 
account, the answer is decidedly less rosy than the conventional wisdom that 
surrounds Loving would suggest.  Throughout the country, and especially in 
the South, concerns about child welfare and other race-neutral grounds were 
often deployed post-Loving to continue divesting white mothers of custody 
when they remarried outside of their race.  In this regard, the post-Loving 
landscape looks much like the landscape in the jurisdictions discussed in Part 
II.A.90  Post-Loving courts, like the pre-Loving courts, continued to be wary 
of interracial unions regardless of their legality.  Like the courts in those 
jurisdictions that permitted interracial marriages prior to 1967, these post-
Loving courts, many of which were in the South, were loath to focus 
explicitly on the fact of a subsequent interracial marriage or relationship in 
making a custodial determination.  Instead, these courts considered the fact 
of an interracial marriage in tandem with a range of factors in determining 
how the child’s interest might be best served.  On this account, the cases that 
preceded Loving provided post-Loving courts with a blueprint for continuing 
to signal disapproval of interracial marriages on nominally race-neutral 
grounds. 
Consider Ethridge v. Ethridge.91  There, a father successfully sought a 
modification of custody upon learning that his ex-wife had remarried and was 
pregnant by a black dentist.92  Despite evidence that the children wished to 
return to their mother and her new husband, and despite evidence that “the 
mother and children were in better circumstances than they had ever known” 
with the mother’s new husband “desirous of supporting the wife and her 
children,” the trial court agreed with the father and modified the custodial 
order accordingly.93 
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On appeal, an Alabama intermediate appellate court upheld the lower 
court’s judgment, despite its own reservations.94  Although the mother 
insisted that the trial court based its decision on her interracial marriage, the 
intermediate appellate court “examined the record closely” and found “no 
overt evidence that the charge [was] true.”95  Still, the appellate court mused 
“whether the trial court would have been so persuaded if the mother were 
married to a caucasian dentist with an income of $56,000 per year.”96  But 
“speculat[ing] affirmatively” on such a provocative question, the appellate 
court surmised, “would be contrary to [its] duty of review and [would] 
dishonor the trial judge without sufficient proof.”97  Mindful of its duty as an 
appellate tribunal, and conscious of the norms of professional courtesy, the 
court affirmed the award of custody to the father.98 
Even where appellate courts were skeptical of the trial court’s rationale, 
the time-consuming nature of litigation, coupled with the capaciousness of 
the best-interest standard, often spelled doom for mothers seeking custody.  
In Langin v. Langin,99 a white mother remarried to an African American man.  
“Shortly thereafter [she] was committed” to a mental facility and her ex-
husband petitioned to have custody transferred.100  The trial court agreed, 
though it transferred custody to the maternal grandparents, citing the ex-
husband’s failure to pay child support.101  To support its decision to divest 
the mother of custody and award custody to a third party, the court opined 
that it “would not be best for the children to take them from the environment 
and the area which they have known, and to transport them into a strange 
place into a racially mixed family.”102  The mother appealed the custodial 
award, and the appellate court appeared receptive to her claims that race 
concerns had unduly influenced the trial court’s deliberations.103 
While this might seem like a victory, the result is likely more mixed.  
Though the appellate court reversed, vacated, and remanded the trial court’s 
order for further proceedings, the mother faced an uphill battle to regain 
custody.  On remand, the case would be heard by the same trial judge who 
had issued the initial custodial award.  Although the trial judge was 
prohibited from focusing unduly on race and the fact of the mother’s 
interracial marriage reconsidering the custody petition, he was authorized to 
weigh “the fitness of the parties . . . , as well as the fitness of the maternal 
grandparents, with whom [the children] have resided in excess of five years, 
the attitude of the spouses of the parties, the mental stability of the parties 
and the numerous other factors as may bear upon the best interest and welfare 
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of the children.”104  Under these circumstances, and in light of the “best 
interests” standard, it is unlikely that a mother with a history of mental 
instability and an African American husband could prevail over the claims of 
the grandparents, who had provided stable, continuous care to the children 
for over five years.105 
Circumstances involving interracial relationships that had not been 
formalized by marriage furnished courts with other ostensibly race-neutral 
grounds on which to base a custodial transfer.  In Brim v. Brim,106 Lynn 
Marie Brim lost custody of her child after beginning an interracial sexual 
relationship with Melvin Jackson, an African American man.107  Critically, 
the trial court noted that “while she [had] no plans to marry Mr. Jackson, she 
had no inclination to discontinue having ‘sexual relations with him . . . quite 
frequently.’”108  Indeed, the court noted that Brim had continued to cohabit 
with Jackson, including sharing her bed with him while her son was in 
residence, “right up to the time of the [custody] hearing.”109  Accordingly, 
the trial court modified its previous order to award custody to the child’s 
father on the basis of changed circumstances, noting that when “a woman 
starts living with a man without the benefit of marriage, where the man 
spends three to five nights a week in that home where the child is . . . [t]his 
does not agree with the Court’s concept of moral conduct.”110 
On appeal, an Oklahoma appellate court agreed.  As it explained, Brim’s 
cohabitation with Jackson in full view of her son was a “substantial post-
divorce change in the home environment.”111  And, despite Brim’s claims 
that she sequestered her relationship from her son, the appellate court was 
skeptical: 
[W]e have a situation where a three-year-old’s subconscious is recording a 
man staying in the house and sleeping in the same bed as his mother three 
to five nights a week.  He may not at all have any meaningful understanding 
of what is going on.  He is unlikely to realize the counterculture 
implications, or the antisocial character of the relationship between his 
mother and Mr. Jackson.  But still his brain records what his eyes see and 
his ears hear.  And unless he can begin now to learn through the same senses 
society’s conceptual norm of man-woman, mother-child, father-child 
relationships, it will, in the next few significant months, become fixed in 
his mind that his mother’s relationship with Mr. Jackson is one society 
accepts as proper.  And because of all people it is his mother involved he 
can become an excellent candidate for a real psychic hang-up when faced 
with having to accept, live and cope with existing incompatible social 
mores.112 
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 With all of this in mind, the appellate court concluded that the trial court 
was “entitled to infer that any prolonged subjection of a young child to a 
countercultural environment probably will have a future adverse effect on 
the small one’s psychological well-being”113 and that the “the child’s 
welfare . . . is best served by a transfer of custody.”114  As for Brim’s 
contention that “the change of custody was reversibly erroneous because it 
was premised solely on the fact that she, a white woman, ‘had been 
cohabiting with a black man,’” the appellate court was flatly dismissive.115  
After all, the trial court explicitly disclaimed any racial considerations, going 
so far as to declare that “this is not a question of color, it is a question of 
morals and to the best interest of the child.”116  On this account, for the 
appellate court, the issue was not whether Brim’s “swain be white, yellow, 
red, brown or black”117 but rather the fact that she allowed her son to live in 
a “home environment society currently considers immoral.”118 
A mother’s unorthodox sexual conduct also shadowed the decision in 
Schexnayder v. Schexnayder.119  There, a trial court vested custody in Sheila 
Schexnayder despite evidence of her interracial, adulterous relationship 
transacted during her marriage.120  In issuing its ruling, the trial court made 
clear its views of the relationship, which Sheila had conducted in a “flagrant, 
even open and notorious” fashion, including “meeting her lover at a 
motel, . . . behind a church, . . . at a bar, behind the school house, on the levee, 
[and] on a little traveled road in the area.”121  Not only was her conduct 
“openly observed”122 and the cause of “scandal and gossip in the 
community,”123 it “was particularly scandalous and offensive to the 
sensibilities of the local community in that her lover was of another race.”124 
Despite these clear misgivings, the trial court was reluctant to strip Sheila 
of custody.  The preference for maternal custody loomed large,125 and, as 
importantly, Loving seemed to put Sheila Schexnayder’s shocking interracial 
romance beyond the trial court’s reach.126  As the trial court noted, “Our laws 
against miscegenation have been ruled unconstitutional and insofar as the law 
is concerned the question of race is irrelevant.”127  Also of relevance was the 
fact that Sheila’s adultery had been intermittent rather than pervasive and 
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ongoing.  Indeed, she averred that the affair had lasted only a few months and 
involved only ten acts of intercourse.128  More importantly, she had ended 
the relationship and “denie[d] having any contact with [her lover].”129  
Noting that there was no proof of any further misconduct and recognizing 
“the very strong maternal preference rule . . . [that] compels an award of very 
young children to the mother,” the trial court awarded “provisional” custody 
to Sheila, subject to her “continued good conduct.”130 
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the trial 
court’s judgment, concluding that where 
the mother has consistently engaged in a course of open and public adultery 
in defiance of generally accepted moral principles and in disregard of the 
embarrassment and injuries which might be sustained by the children, then 
the court is justified in depriving her of the care of the children, and in 
awarding custody to the father.131 
Although the Louisiana high court did not refer explicitly to race, the fact of 
Sheila’s interracial romance haunted the appellate court’s decision.  The 
“embarrassment and injuries which might be sustained by the children” were 
likely not just those associated with a parent’s sexual conduct but with 
conduct that also transgressed racial boundaries—boundaries that persisted, 
even in Loving’s wake.132  And while a series of “infrequent indiscretions 
may be born out of human frailty” and thereby overlooked, in this case, the 
mother’s “open and public adultery in defiance of generally accepted moral 
principles” could not be similarly dismissed.133  Such conduct contravened 
the essential duty of parents “to demonstrate to his or her children qualities 
of good moral character.”134  If “a child learns by example,” then Sheila 
Schexnayder’s lax moral leadership would surely infect her children and lead 
them astray.135 
There is much that can be said about the two decisions in Schexnayder.  As 
an initial matter, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to reverse the trial 
court’s ruling, which had been affirmed by the intermediate appellate court, 
was highly unorthodox.  Unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion, 
which by itself is an incredibly high bar, appellate courts generally defer to 
the trial court’s custodial determinations.136  Further, though unwilling to 
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actually name race, the high court’s opinion nonetheless trades in stock tropes 
that historically attended societal discomfort with interracial relationships.  It 
was not just that Sheila Schexnayder was open and notorious137 and therefore 
unwilling to keep her transgressive conduct under wraps.  It was that, in 
conducting her relationship, she cared little for the fact that her behavior 
would reflect poorly upon her children.  More troublingly, her conduct set a 
poor example for her children, who were receiving the misguided impression 
that such relationships—adulterous, interracial relationships—were normal 
and acceptable rather than deeply transgressive and regrettable. 
But while the high court’s decision expressed the sort of concerns that we 
might ordinarily expect in these circumstances, it is the trial court’s opinion 
that is perhaps most revealing about the continued disapprobation of 
interracial romance, even ten years after Loving.  Although the Schexnayder 
trial court ultimately awarded Sheila custody, its decision was hardly a full-
throated endorsement of interracial relationships.  And, indeed, the trial 
court’s rationale speaks volumes about the weight of the interracial romance 
in the disposition of the case.  Only a decade after Loving, interracial 
romances remained taboo—so much so that they were the cause of gossip 
and scandal in a small town.138  Still, the court recognized Loving’s 
importance as a limit on its ability to rely too heavily on the mother’s 
romance in determining custody.139  Tellingly, gendered concerns about the 
proper care of young children weighed more heavily on the court, especially 
in light of a mother’s apparent willingness to relinquish her lover and the 
relationship.140 
However, this aspect of the case is also worth noting.  Not only did the 
court credit Sheila Schexnayder’s decision to give up her relationship, its 
custodial award was contingent upon her “continued good conduct”141—that 
is, staying away from her lover and others like him.  That a court could 
continue to keep tabs on a litigant after making an award of custody is 
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unsurprising.  A critical feature of divorce and child custody proceedings is 
that the court retains jurisdiction over the custody decision and thus is free to 
modify custodial arrangements in the future to address changed 
circumstances and vindicate the best interests of the child. 
In Schexnayder, the court’s continuing jurisdiction, however, takes on a 
more controlling posture.  In specifically noting Sheila’s abandonment of her 
interracial relationship and making custody contingent upon her “continued 
good conduct,”142 the court’s decision might be understood as an informal 
“ban” on any future involvement with her lover—and, more generally, 
interracial romance.  Obviously, an informal ban is meaningfully different 
from the criminal miscegenation bans held unconstitutional in Loving.  That 
said, such an approach was likely to be as effective as any criminal ban.  
Living in a small community, where her actions were likely to be closely 
observed, it is unlikely that Sheila Schexnayder felt free to resume her 
interracial relationship—or even to engage in a new interracial relationship 
at some point in the future.  The fear of losing custody of her children may 
have been as effective a deterrent to seeking love across the color line. 
Taken together, all of these cases make clear the continued skepticism and, 
in some cases, antipathy that attended interracial unions—before and after 
Loving.  Though post-Loving courts were loath to rest their decisions entirely 
on the fact of an interracial marriage or relationship, they nonetheless took 
these facts into account in their decisions. 
C.  Aftermath:  Palmore v. Sidoti 
Obviously, not all of these cases ended tragically with a mother losing 
custody.  In a number of cases, a trial court’s decision was reversed on the 
ground that consideration of an interracial relationship, without more, was 
insufficient to constitute a change in circumstances that warranted a 
modification of custody.143  Critically, in 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court 
constitutionalized this stance in Palmore v. Sidoti.144  There, a Florida trial 
court divested a white mother of custody because of her remarriage to an 
African American man.145  In awarding custody to the father, the trial court 
recognized that “the father’s evident resentment of the mother’s choice of a 
black partner” was, by itself, an insufficient ground for transferring 
custody.146  That said, the trial court nonetheless noted other circumstances 
that could be brought to bear on a modification decision: 
It is of some significance, however, that the mother did see fit to bring a 
man into her home and carry on a sexual relationship with him without 
being married to him.  Such action tended to place gratification of her own 
desires ahead of her concern for the child’s future welfare. . . .  [D]espite 
the strides that have been made in bettering relations between the races in 
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this country, it is inevitable that [the child] will . . . suffer from the social 
stigmatization that is sure to come.147 
In petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for review, the mother explicitly 
relied on Loving’s logic.  Maintaining that the trial court’s decision rested 
solely on the fact of her interracial marriage, the mother argued that, under 
Loving, “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . prohibit a court . . . from relying upon a subsequent 
interracial marriage . . . as a ground for ordering a change of custody.”148  
The Court granted her petition for review and, on appeal, reversed the lower 
court’s ruling.  In so doing, the Court noted that while “the child’s welfare 
was the controlling factor,” the trial court “made no effort to place its holding 
on any ground other than race. . . .  [I]t is clear that the outcome would have 
been different had petitioner married a Caucasian male of similar 
respectability.”149  Although the best-interests standard required courts to 
consider all of the factors that might affect a child’s welfare, “the reality of 
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict” were not 
“permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody 
of its natural mother.”150  In holding that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them 
effect,”151 the Palmore Court specifically cited Loving alongside other 
canonical equal protection cases mandating “the most exacting scrutiny” for 
explicit racial classifications.152 
Like Loving, Palmore drew a line in the sand, condemning the use of race 
in custodial decisions.  But, in practice, courts have interpreted Palmore far 
more narrowly than many appreciate.  Indeed, some courts have concluded 
that Palmore does not preclude consideration of race entirely.153  As one 
federal appellate court noted, in the context of a foster-care placement, “at 
most [Palmore] establishes that race may not be the sole factor in determining 
the best interests of the child.”154  Other courts similarly have determined 
that Palmore requires only that courts refrain from relying exclusively on 
race and racial concerns as the basis for their decisions.155  As Professor Katie 
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Eyer observes, “only the most unsophisticated government actor would be 
unable to demonstrate compliance” with this narrow interpretation of 
Palmore.156 
But, even following Palmore, in those circumstances where racial 
concerns appeared to predominate in determining custody, the capacious 
best-interests standard continued to provide cover for judicial decision-
making.  Jennings v. Jennings157 is instructive on this point.  There, an 
Alabama intermediate appellate court upheld a trial court’s decision 
awarding custody to a father in the face of the mother’s relationship, begun 
during the marriage, with an African American doctor.158  On appeal, the 
mother claimed that racial concerns had shaped the trial court’s decision in 
violation of Palmore.159  The appellate court disagreed and noted that the 
trial court had only become aware of the interracial relationship because the 
mother’s attorney had introduced that fact in his cross examination of the 
husband.  The trial court had also specifically cited Palmore for the 
proposition that “it would be inappropriate and beyond the bounds of the 
court’s discretion to permit racial differences to control an award of 
custody.”160  Despite considerable evidence of the trial court’s consideration 
of the mother’s interracial relationship, the appellate court maintained that 
the custodial award was amply supported by nonracial considerations—
namely, the trial court’s finding that, in the “pursuit of her relationship,” the 
mother had “substantially ignored” her child’s “sensibilities and moral 
development.”161 
Similar “race-neutral” concerns were at play in Parker v. Parker,162 where 
a Tennessee trial court granted a father’s request for a modification of 
custody.  The court’s decision was supported by evidence of the mother’s 
interracial relationship, including a private investigator’s video recording of 
the boyfriend visiting the mother’s home, as well as witness testimony about 
the relationship and the harm posed to the child if “raised in an interracial 
household because of small town views.”163  When pressed, the trial judge 
later disclaimed any notion that his decision was based on the interracial 
nature of the relationship.  Instead, he maintained, his concern about the 
mother’s relationship was animated by his disapproval of “shacking up.  I am 
not referring to white and black.”164  Still, as the Tennessee Supreme Court 
concluded, the record contained statements indicating that the judge’s 
decision had focused unduly on race.  Although the Tennessee high court was 
“troubled by the interjection of race based testimony . . . which is so clearly 
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prohibited in Palmore,” it concluded that the trial court had not relied unduly 
on racial concerns but instead had based its decision on “the relevant factors,” 
including “the presence of an extramarital affair that interfered with the well-
being of the child.”165  Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld 
the custodial award.166 
Thus, while Palmore reinforced Loving’s logic by prohibiting judges from 
relying explicitly on racial considerations in custodial decisions, judges were 
still able to weigh their views of interracial relationships so long as the 
relationship was not the determinative factor in the decision.  And, as these 
cases suggest, courts often weighed the impact of the mother’s interracial 
relationship on her children, though they were careful to make clear that the 
custodial decision rested on other, race-neutral factors. 
III.  LESSONS FOR LOVING FROM INTERRACIAL CUSTODY CASES 
The custodial cases recounted above complicate the narrative of unalloyed 
racial progress with which Loving is associated.  Loving affirmatively 
disavowed criminal bans on interracial marriages and relationships and, in so 
doing, removed the most intractable legal punishments and impediments to 
such relationships.  However, as these cases make clear, Loving did not 
remove all legal punishments and deterrents to such unions.  Through 
custodial awards, courts could continue to use the law to signal 
disapprobation of interracial unions.  Thus, in jurisdictions where interracial 
unions were legal prior to Loving, courts nonetheless wrestled with the 
question of whether such unions, despite their legality, were morally 
appropriate spaces for raising white children. 
Courts worried that, by virtue of their intimate connection with a person of 
color, white children would lose the privileges of whiteness—that they would 
become irredeemably imbued with the other race.  And critically, though the 
courts’ worries were arguably for the white children whose mothers had 
transgressed racial boundaries, it is clear from these pre-Loving cases that 
these decisions were as much about the mother’s conduct as they were about 
the effect of that conduct on the children.  Not only had the mother 
compromised her children’s racial identity by forcing them to live in an 
interracial home, she had compromised her own racial identity through her 
associations with her new black husband and his community.  In this regard, 
these pre-Loving cases underscore the widespread disapproval of interracial 
unions—both in jurisdictions that maintained criminal bans against 
miscegenation and in more progressive jurisdictions where such unions were 
permitted. 
As importantly, these cases make clear that the methods for regulating and 
censuring interracial relationships were varied.  In the South and other 
jurisdictions where interracial unions were proscribed, criminal law 
furnished the vehicle for censuring and punishing attempts to live outside the 
norm of racial homogamy.  By contrast, in those ostensibly progressive 
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jurisdictions where interracial unions were permitted, different means of 
expressing disapprobation of interracial unions were deployed—in these 
cases, through the civil context of child custody. 
One might expect the Loving decision to dramatically change the 
regulatory landscape—and, indeed, it did.  After Loving, the criminal law 
could no longer be used to enforce conformity with the norm of racial 
homogamy.  In one fell swoop, miscegenation bans were invalidated, and 
interracial unions were recognized as lawful marriages throughout the 
country. 
Nevertheless, the child-custody cases discussed above make clear that the 
absence of criminal barriers to interracial relationships does not necessarily 
mean the absence of all legal barriers to interracial relationships.  Nor does it 
mean the absence of state regulation of such unions.  In jurisdictions where 
interracial unions had been lawful, even before Loving, post-Loving courts 
continued to divest white mothers of custody by relying on a range of 
considerations.  As they had done in the years preceding Loving, courts in 
these “progressive” jurisdictions acknowledged the fact of the mother’s 
interracial relationship but took care to root their decisions in race-neutral 
rationales—the mother’s promiscuity, her willingness to prioritize her 
relationship above her children, her general unfitness for custody.  Both 
before and after Loving, courts in these jurisdictions continued to express 
their disapprobation of—and indeed, regulate—interracial unions by resort 
to child-custody awards. 
Likewise, in those jurisdictions where criminal barriers had only recently 
been removed by virtue of Loving, the effort to regulate and censure 
interracial relationships did not end with Loving.  Instead, the impulse to 
regulate—and censure—interracial unions simply shifted to a new domain—
child custody determinations.  In this regard, the post-Loving courts adopted 
the methods of their counterparts in the more progressive jurisdictions where 
interracial unions had been legal.  But critically, despite Loving’s invalidation 
of miscegenation bans, the regulatory impulse was never entirely disrupted; 
it simply shifted to new locales outside of the criminal law. 
Of course, in all of these cases, the mother was legally permitted to marry 
the partner of her choice, even if courts—and society—looked askance at the 
resulting interracial union.  Unlike a miscegenation ban, a court’s custodial 
decision did not bar interracial marriage, nor did it render the marriage null 
and void.  In this regard, there is a considerable difference between a criminal 
ban and civil decision to transfer custody.  This distinction, however, misses 
the point.  The decision to divest a parent of custody is one of the most 
profound expressions of disapproval that a court can deliver.  While it is 
wholly distinct from a criminal prohibition on interracial marriage, a court’s 
decision to strip a mother of custody, in whole or in part because of her 
interracial marriage, is a form of regulation that has a decidedly punitive 
cast—a punishment for daring to cross the color line and a stern deterrent to 
other women who might consider following suit in the future. 
Thus, while Loving invalidated criminal bans on interracial marriages, it 
did not eliminate all legal impediments and deterrents, nor did it diminish 
2018] THE REGULATION OF SEX AND SEXUALITY 2695 
fully law’s direct presence in the project of regulating interracial unions.  
Make no mistake about it:  law continued to play a direct role in expressing 
antipathy for interracial unions.  Custodial decisions like these, which 
expressed concern for children raised in interracial unions, or that otherwise 
questioned the mother’s judgment for entering into her relationship, both 
reflected and fed the continued skepticism and disapprobation of interracial 
unions. 
Yet, these cases do more than simply complicate Loving’s legacy insofar 
as it concerns law’s embrace of interracial relationships.  They also make 
clear the shortcomings of decriminalization as a model for legal reform.  As 
I have noted elsewhere, although Loving is a stalwart of the constitutional 
law canon and the family law canon, it is also a criminal law case.167  And it 
is not alone in this respect.  Most of the cases that are credited with 
liberalizing social and legal norms around contraception, abortion, 
nonmarital sex, and same-sex sex and sexuality—Griswold v. 
Connecticut,168 Eisenstadt v. Baird,169 Roe v. Wade,170 Lawrence v. 
Texas171—are criminal law cases with constitutional dimensions.172  In this 
regard, Loving is part of a larger historical arc in which decriminalization has 
been a principal vehicle for liberalizing social mores around sex and 
sexuality, and, more recently, recognizing LGBTQ rights.173 
Yet, as we reflect upon this history and the decriminalization impulse that 
fueled these profound changes, a surprising commonality emerges:  in all of 
these circumstances, criminal law was used to mark and condemn certain 
conduct as unworthy and illegitimate.174  As norms shifted, decriminalization 
underwrote the effort to reform these laws.  But even as criminal bans on this 
conduct were formally eliminated, the disapprobation and stigmatization that 
accompanied—and indeed, fueled—the criminal bans did not dissipate 
entirely.  Instead, these impulses were rechanneled into other noncriminal 
contexts.175 
Even after interracial unions were decriminalized and legalized, we 
nevertheless see the impulse to punish interracial relationships emerge in 
other, noncriminal domains, such as child-custody determinations.176  
Likewise, although Lawrence v. Texas decriminalized sex outside of 
marriage and same-sex intimacy, the impulse to censure and punish such 
relationships did not evaporate with that decision.  Instead, as I have 
elsewhere documented, it was simply relocated to other, noncriminal 
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contexts.177  Through the use of professional codes of conduct and 
administrative regulations in various workplaces, nonmarital sexual 
conduct—cohabitation and adultery, as well as nonmarital same-sex 
conduct—continued to be regulated and, indeed, censured through other 
forms of law.178 
The regulation of abortion and contraception are also instructive on this 
point.  Although the use of contraception and abortion procedures have been 
decriminalized since Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, many argue that the 
decision to use contraception and to have an abortion remain deeply 
stigmatized and, indeed, subject to state regulation that, to some, has a 
decidedly punitive cast.179  On this account, civil laws that permit employers 
and providers to opt out of providing contraceptive coverage or that regulate 
various aspects of the process of obtaining an abortion are informal ways of 
signaling the continued disapprobation of these choices—and indeed limiting 
access to these choices.180  As some proponents of abortion have argued, 
although abortion is nominally legal in the United States, it is the most 
regulated medical procedure in the country.181  And while the various laws 
that regulate abortion access are, independently, unobjectionable as civil 
regulations, taken together, they have the effect of almost entirely proscribing 
abortion access.182  That is, they effectively function as a ban, just as criminal 
prohibitions did, and they make clear the disapprobation and stigma with 
which this choice continues to be associated. 
Thinking about the decriminalization of intimate life in this way 
illuminates the nuances of other conversations and discussions.  Over the last 
six years, criminal law scholars and policy makers have engaged in a rich 
debate about overcriminalization and mass incarceration.183  Recognizing 
that overcriminalization creates a range of societal problems, many have 
begun advocating for misdemeanor decriminalization:  eliminating jail time 
for minor offenses such as marijuana possession and driving violations and 
downgrading these felony offenses to so-called “fine-only” or “nonjailable” 
misdemeanor offenses.184 
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In assessing these reforms, legal scholars like Professor Alexandra 
Natapoff have emphasized that the shift to misdemeanor decriminalization is 
complicated and not necessarily an unvarnished good.185  As she explains, 
decriminalization does not mean deregulation.186  Even under a misdemeanor 
regime, the offense conduct continues to be subject to state regulation, albeit 
less robust regulation than it was when it was classified as a felony offense.187  
Further, even though misdemeanor decriminalization promises the 
imposition of fines, probation, and other sanctions, rather than jail time, the 
behavior is still subject to public disapprobation.  Misdemeanors are still 
crimes.188 
Natapoff raises important points that acknowledge the very real limitations 
of misdemeanor decriminalization.  But interestingly, in lodging this critique, 
Natapoff juxtaposes misdemeanor decriminalization with what might be 
termed “civil rights” decriminalization or legalization.189  This model of legal 
reform, she maintains, is one that relies on decriminalization as a vehicle for 
legalizing conduct that was previously the subject of intense disapprobation, 
like contraceptive use, same-sex sodomy, and interracial marriage.  As 
importantly, the process of decriminalization and subsequent legalization, 
Natapoff suggests, is akin to deregulation:  “When same-sex rights advocates 
call for the decriminalization of gay sex, they mean that the state should get 
out of the business of regulating that intimate conduct altogether.”190  Thus, 
where misdemeanor decriminalization fails, and civil rights 
decriminalization succeeds, is that in the latter, decriminalization results in 
the legalization of the conduct.  And legalization, Natapoff and others appear 
to suggest, is akin to complete deregulation.191 
The history of interracial child custody cases makes clear that, like 
misdemeanor decriminalization, the civil rights decriminalization-
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legalization paradigm poses challenges for those seeking less state regulation 
in their lives.  As the post-Loving landscape shows, the legalization of 
interracial marriage did not end state regulation of this choice.  While Loving 
resulted in the elimination of criminal bans on interracial unions, it did not 
eliminate all forms of legal regulation.  The mode of regulation morphed and 
shifted from the criminal domain to a different context, but, in the end, it was 
regulation all the same.192 
Understanding this aspect of decriminalization helps us to recognize this 
regulatory dynamic, even when it presents in less obvious forms.  This term, 
the U.S. Supreme Court will take up Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission.193  There, Jack Phillips, a Colorado baker and cake 
artist, refuses to provide cakes for celebrations commemorating the marriages 
of same-sex couples.194  Phillips argues that First Amendment protections for 
free exercise and expression exclude him from the ambit of Colorado’s 
nondiscrimination statute, which prohibits sexual orientation discrimination 
in places of public accommodation.195 
The issue has prompted considerable discussion—particularly about the 
collision of religious freedom and LGBTQ rights.196  But what is interesting 
is that amidst all of the discussion of the First Amendment and LGBTQ 
rights, no one has thought about Masterpiece Cakeshop as evidence of the 
regulatory displacement that we have seen time and time again in the wake 
of decriminalization.  In 2003, Lawrence v. Texas decriminalized same-sex 
sex outside of marriage197 and twelve years later in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage.198  Jack Phillips’s refusal to 
provide cakes for same-sex weddings precedes the Court’s decision in 
Obergefell, but, nevertheless, we might understand it as an expression of 
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continued disapprobation of same-sex intimacy and certainly the prospect of 
legalized same-sex marriages.  That is, it is evidence that legalization does 
not mean complete acceptance or the absence of regulation. 
Of course, Jack Phillips’s personal objections to same-sex couples and 
same-sex unions are not the same as state criminal regulation.  But if the 
Supreme Court does find that certain constitutional rights or statutory rights 
shelter this kind of personal disapprobation from the ambit of 
nondiscrimination laws, that might be akin to state regulation—facilitating 
the signaling of disapproval and censure of certain conduct and those 
associated with it.  Or, more particularly, it might be understood as akin to 
the state giving effect to private biases199 and, indeed, deputizing private 
actors to express the kind of disapprobation and discrimination that the state 
itself is now unable to express. 
That at least was the Supreme Court’s posture in Bob Jones University v. 
United States,200 decided in 1983, sixteen years after Loving and the year 
before Palmore.  There, Bob Jones University was denied tax-exempt status 
because it denied admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage 
or who were known to advocate interracial marriage or dating, and it expelled 
students who were partners to an interracial marriage.201  The University 
argued that such views were mandated by their religious beliefs and thus 
subject to First Amendment protections.202  The Court disagreed, citing 
Loving for the proposition that a ban on intermarriage or interracial dating “is 
a form of racial discrimination.”203  On this account, crediting the First 
Amendment as a means of shielding such discrimination from judicial 
scrutiny was akin to facilitating racial discrimination in violation of Loving.  
More importantly, in referencing Loving, the Court tacitly acknowledged that 
Bob Jones University’s civil prohibition on interracial dating and marriage 
was as objectionable as the criminal ban invalidated in that landmark case. 
This is all to say that because modern civil rights reform has hinged on 
decriminalization, we must understand and appreciate decriminalization’s 
limits as a vehicle of law reform.  So much of the effort to broaden the scope 
of liberty in intimate life has depended on removing criminal law as a marker 
of the state’s presence in our lives.  But, as the history of interracial child 
custody decisions suggests, decriminalization is no panacea. 
To be clear, this critique is not intended to dismiss the obvious gains that 
accompany decriminalization.  Removing the specter of criminal liability 
from intimate life is surely an important first step for civil rights reform in 
that it ensures that individuals cannot be deprived of their liberty and 
incarcerated as a mechanism of state disapprobation.  But imprisonment is 
not the only (or, indeed, even the worst) punishment that the state can mete 
out to those who dare challenge state-sanctioned norms.  In this regard, while 
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we can certainly celebrate the progress that decriminalization symbolizes, we 
ought not get too complacent.  And we ought not regard decriminalization 
and legalization as synonymous with deregulation.  As the interracial custody 
cases make clear, regulation comes in many forms—some more obvious than 
others.  But regulation is regulation, whether it occurs via the hammer of the 
criminal law or through the subtler, velvet glove of civil regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
In the years since it was decided, Loving has stood as an exemplar of our 
constitutional commitments to equality and liberty in intimate life.  But in 
focusing on these aspects of Loving, we have perhaps overlooked the other 
lessons that might be gleaned from this landmark decision. 
Today, fifty years later, it is worth remembering that Loving was not 
simply a case about equality and liberty, but also about imposing limits on 
the state’s ability to use the criminal law to regulate the contours of intimate 
life.  But even as Loving designed limits on the state, decriminalizing 
interracial marriages and advancing the cause of equality and liberty, it was 
not a magic bullet.  And it reminds us that decriminalization is rarely a magic 
bullet.  Indeed, it is simply one facet of the many regulatory possibilities 
available to the state.  If our goal is to reduce the degree to which the state is 
a palpable presence in the recesses of our lives, then we must be poised to 
recognize the way in which the state’s regulatory impulses may shift and be 
transformed—all in service of its continued control over our intimate lives. 
